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I. APPELLATE REVIEW BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT
A. MANDAMUS
HE Survey period saw a host of mandamus decisions by the Texas
Supreme Court.1 In granting mandamus relief, the supreme court
repeatedly relied on-and arguably expanded-the two-part test
of In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America, decided in 2004.2 The sheer
number of decisions by the supreme court granting mandamus relief sug-
gests that mandamus relief may now be more easily obtained under the
standards laid down in Prudential.
1. Pre-2003 Challenges to Expert Reports in Health Care Cases
In possibly the most important procedural opinion of the Survey pe-
riod, the Texas Supreme Court in In re McAllen Medical Center ex-
pounded on the "costs and benefits" analysis of Prudential to determine
the propriety of interlocutory (mandamus) review.3 That case involved a
medical malpractice lawsuit by 400 plaintiffs representing 224 patients
against a single doctor. The hospital that had credentialed the doctor to
perform thoracic surgery moved to dismiss, challenging expert reports on
the grounds that the expert was not qualified. The trial court sat on the
motion for four years, then denied it.4 At the time, this was not an order
subject to interlocutory review, 5 meaning the ruling would not be re-
viewed until after the considerable time and expense of a mass tort
lawsuit.
On mandamus, the Texas Supreme Court first agreed that the expert
reports were deficient and then considered whether the hospital had an
adequate remedy by appeal. 6 The supreme court found mandamus justi-
fied. 7 The specific basis for the supreme court's finding was to enforce
the purpose behind the legislature's enactment of the health care liability
statute-to meet the crisis in the costs and availability of medical care
created by the traditional rules of litigation.8 With the health care liabil-
1. The Survey period is Nov. 1, 2007, to Oct. 31, 2008.
2. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004).
3. 275 S.W.3d 458, 464-69 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
4. Id. at 462.
5. In 2003, the legislature enacted Chapter 74 of the TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE,
which provides for interlocutory review. See id. at 466.
6. Id. at 463, 467.
7. Id. at 470.
8. Id. at 461-62.
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ity statute, the legislature "declared that plaintiffs must support health
care claims with expert reports shortly after filing."9 Unless enforced by
Texas courts, "[t]his expedited deadline will of course never accomplish
the purposes of the Texas Legislature." 10 Accordingly, the supreme court
held that "mandamus relief is available when the purposes of the health
care statute would otherwise be defeated."'"
In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court reinforced the Pruden-
tial analysis: "Whether a clear abuse of discretion can be adequately rem-
edied by appeal depends on a careful analysis of costs and benefits of
interlocutory review. As this balance depends heavily on circumstances,
it must be guided by analysis of principles rather than simple rules that
treat cases as categories. '12 In In re McAllen Medical Center, the su-
preme court found that the legislature had already balanced the majority
of the relevant costs and benefits: "the Legislature found that the cost of
conducting plenary trials of claims as to which no supporting expert could
be found was affecting the availability and affordability of health care-
driving physicians from Texas and patients from medical care they
need."'1 3 According to the supreme court, "denying mandamus review
would defeat everything the Legislature was trying to accomplish."' 14
As proof that not every pre-2003 case involving a challenge to a defi-
cient expert report is subject to review by mandamus, the Texas Supreme
Court held mandamus relief inappropriate in In re Roberts, where the
alleged error was the trial court's grant of a thirty-day grace period to the
plaintiffs to amend their allegedly deficient expert reports. 15 "Because a
30-day extension-even if unjustified-does not substantially prolong liti-
gation or allow for extensive discovery," and therefore does not frustrate
the purpose of the health care liability statute, the error was not subject
to mandamus review.16
9. Id. at 461.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 462.
12. Id. at 464.
13. Id. The dissent (Wainwright, J., Jefferson, C.J., and O'Neill, J.) opened its opinion
with the theme song in Disney's Aladdin: "A whole new world ... A new fantastic point of
view... No one to tell us no Or where to go . I..." Id  at 470. According to the dissent,
"[tihe Court creates a whole new world today, jettisoning the well-estab-
lished precept that delay and expense alone do not justify mandamus review.
While such costs are undesirable and should be avoided when appropriate,
the requirement of an inadequate remedy on appeal served as a check on
appellate entanglement in incidental trial rulings and as a guide to the bench
and bar on when to seek mandamus review."
Id. at 473-74. See also In re Methodist Healthcare Sys. of San Antonio, Ltd., 256 S.W.3d
263, 264 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (directing court of appeals to recon-
sider, in light of In re McAllen Med. Ctr., its refusal of mandamus review of expert report).
14. McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d at 466.
15. In re Roberts, 255 S.W.3d 640, 641-42 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)
(directing court of appeals to vacate order compelling withdrawal of thirty-day grace
period).




In In re Team Rocket, L.P., the Texas Supreme Court was faced with a
trial court's improper refusal to enforce a prior venue ruling by another
trial court.17 There, the plaintiffs filed suit in a Harris County court,
which granted defendants' motion to transfer venue to Williamson
County. To avoid the venue transfer, the plaintiff nonsuited and refiled
the case in a Fort Bend County court, which refused to enforce the prior
venue ruling. The supreme court granted mandamus relief, concluding
that the Fort Bend County court's refusal to enforce the Harris County's
venue determination was improper because "a final determination fixing
venue in a particular county" is "conclusive as to those parties and
claims." 8
In granting mandamus relief, the supreme court analyzed the availabil-
ity of such relief under Prudential. First, the supreme court determined
the adequacy of appeal "by balancing the benefits of mandamus review
against the detriments."'19 Would mandamus "preserve important sub-
stantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss? ' '2° The supreme
court concluded it would because, by defying the Harris County court's
venue ruling through nonsuit and refiling of the case, the plaintiffs dis-
rupted the balance created by the venue statutes-a plaintiff has the first
choice of venue and a defendant has one motion to transfer venue.21 By
shifting the balance in their favor, the plaintiffs impaired the defendant's
procedural rights.22
The supreme court next considered whether mandamus would "allow
the appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction to the law that
would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments. ' 23 This
test was met because the legal issue involved-"the construction of Texas
venue statutes and related rules in the context of voluntary nonsuit"-
was "likely to recur," as demonstrated by the courts of appeal that had
already addressed the issue.24
Finally, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether mandamus
would "spare litigants and the public 'the time and money utterly wasted
enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.' ' '25
Concluding that it would, the supreme court noted that "extraordinary
relief can be warranted when a trial court subjects taxpayers, defendants,
and all of the state's district courts to meaningless proceedings and tri-
als."'26 "To say that the Fort Bend County trial court ... committed re-
17. 256 S.W.3d 257, 258 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).




22. Id. at 262.
23. Id. (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004)).
24. Id.
25. ld. (quoting Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136).
26. Id.
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versible error while declining to correct the injustice would compromise
the integrity of the venue statute and result in an irreversible waste of
resources.,
27
3. Pre-suit Depositions in Health Care Lawsuits
Discovery in health care cases is limited by statute until the plaintiff
serves an expert report.28 On mandamus review, the Texas Supreme
Court considered whether this statutory prohibition applies to pre-suit
depositions pursuant to Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 29
In deciding whether mandamus was appropriate to resolve the issue, the
supreme court held that a conflict among the courts of appeals was a
factor "we must consider," because that indicated the issue was recur-
ring.30 The supreme court also noted that correction after final judgment
was unlikely, "as it is hard to imagine how allowing discovery a little too
early could ever be harmful error-either by causing rendition of an im-
proper judgment or preventing the presentation of an appeal. '31 Further,
pre-suit depositions, if inappropriate, could not be "untaken," so error
could not be cured on appeal after final judgment. 32 The supreme court
concluded that, given the unique circumstances of the case and unques-
tionable loss of substantive and procedural rights, mandamus relief was
available. 33
4. Recusal
In 1998, the Texas Supreme Court held that mandamus is not available
for the denial of a motion to recuse. 34 The supreme court revisited this
issue during the Survey period, openly acknowledging that "[o]ur manda-
mus standards have evolved since [1998]. We now ask whether 'any ben-
efits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments."' 35
Regardless, even under this standard, the supreme court concluded there
is still no significant benefit to mandamus relief in the recusal context.36
27. Id. at 263. Justice Wainwright, joined by Justice O'Neill and Chief Justice Jeffer-
son, filed a concurring opinion, disagreeing with the Court's "expansion of its mandamus
jurisdiction beyond established legal tenets." Id. Because the supreme court "has indeed
crossed that bridge," Justice Wainwright reluctantly joined the supreme court's opinion.
Id.
28. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(s) (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008).
29. In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
30. Id. at 419.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 419-20.
33. Id. at 420; see also In re Kiberu, 262 S.W.3d 806, 806 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding) (directing court of appeals to reconsider petition for writ of mandamus in light
of Jorden).
34. In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428-29 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
35. In re McKee, 248 S.W.3d 164, 165 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)




5. Forum Selection Clauses and Forum Non Conveniens
In In re Lyon Financial Services, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court con-
firmed that "mandamus is available to enforce a forum selection clause"
because "[t]here is no adequate remedy by appeal when a trial court ref-
uses to enforce" such a clause.37 Then, relying on the availability of man-
damus relief to enforce forum-selection clauses, the supreme court in In
re Pirelli Tire, L.L.C. held that mandamus relief is also available to re-
view an order denying a motion to dismiss based on forum non con-
veniens.38 An erroneous denial of a forum-non-conveniens motion "is
closely analogous" to a forum-selection clause, and "for the same reasons
cannot be adequately rectified on appeal."'39
6. Arbitration
As in In re Palacios two years ago, the Texas Supreme Court again
faced the issue during this Survey period of the propriety of mandamus
relief in the context of an order compelling arbitration-but this time
with a different result.4 0 In In re Poly-America, L.P., the supreme court
first determined that the Prudential standard for granting mandamus re-
lief in the context of an order compelling arbitration (the benefits of man-
damus outweigh the detriments) "is similar" to the standard in federal
court (the movant has a "clear and indisputable" right to issuance of the
writ).4 ' The supreme court then concluded, without expressly applying
these standards, that mandamus relief is appropriate to compel arbitra-
tion where portions of the arbitration agreement are unconscionable and
void but severable from the remainder of the agreement to arbitrate. 42
Along these same lines, the Texas Supreme Court also confirmed dur-
ing the Survey period that an order compelling arbitration may be re-
viewed post-arbitration. "[P]arties waive nothing by foregoing
interlocutory review and awaiting a final judgment to appeal. '4 3 Further,
a prior denial of mandamus relief, "without comment on the merits,"
from an order compelling arbitration "cannot deprive another appellate
court from considering the matter in a subsequent appeal."44
37. 257 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
38. 247 S.W.3d 670, 679 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding).
39. Id.
40. The supreme court faced this issue last Survey period in In re Palacios. See In re
Palacios, 221 S.W.3d 564, 564-65 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding).
41. 262 S.W.3d 337, 346-47 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
42. Id. at 360-61. The dissent disagreed, noting that "[t]he hard thing about granting
mandamus relief is knowing when to stop." Id. at 361 (Brister, J., dissenting). The dissent
argued that the majority's departure from its position just two years ago in Palacios-"that
mandamus review was available for 'orders that deny arbitration, but not orders that com-
pel it'-"-brought the supreme court "full circle." Id. "Apparently, so long as one expresses
qualms, Palacios is a dead letter." Id.
43. Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 586 (Tex. 2008); see Chambers v. O'Quinn,
242 S.W.3d 30, 30-31 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam).
44. Chambers, 242 S.W.3d at 32. During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court
confirmed the availability of mandamus relief in other contexts as well: when a political
party officer refuses to perform a duty imposed by law in connection with an election, In re
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7. Mandamus Procedure
As a general rule, a party must seek mandamus relief in the court of
appeals before seeking it in the Texas Supreme Court. In In re Baylor
Medical Center at Garland, the supreme court clarified that this step is
unnecessary when the court of appeals has already considered the order
at issue and denied relief, albeit in a prior proceeding.45
B. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
1. Post-2003 Review of Expert Reports in Health Care Cases
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court resolved a split
among the courts of appeal regarding appellate jurisdiction to conduct
interlocutory review of allegedly inadequate expert reports pursuant to
section 51.014(a)(9) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
(Code). 46 Since the enactment in 2003 of the provision providing for such
interlocutory appeals, twelve of the fourteen courts of appeal had rou-
tinely conducted interlocutory review of allegedly inadequate expert re-
ports in health care cases. However, the Fort Worth and Waco Courts of
Appeal had refused to conduct such appeals, holding that they had no
jurisdiction to do so. 47
The supreme court resolved this conflict in Lewis. In that case, when
the defendant doctor "moved to dismiss the case for failure to serve an
expert report, [the plaintiff] pointed to a thank-you-for-your-referral let-
ter in the medical records. '48 The letter contained none of the requisites
for an expert report. "[T]he trial court refused to dismiss, instead grant-
ing [the plaintiff] a 30-day extension" to file an adequate report, which he
did. 49 The doctor "again moved to dismiss, and the trial court again de-
nied his motion. '50 The Waco Court of Appeals then denied the doctor's
appeal for want of jurisdiction. 5 1
The supreme court reversed, concluding that a defendant in a medical
malpractice suit may bring an interlocutory appeal if the trial court denies
a motion to dismiss when a plaintiff has failed to timely file an expert
report or when defects in a timely filed deficient expert report have not
been cured within the statutory timeframe. 52 The supreme court held
that a motion seeking dismissal and attorney's fees on the ground that an
Torry, 244 S.W.3d 849, 850-51 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); when a trial
court issues an order after its plenary power has expired, In re Brookshire Grocery Co.,
250 S.W.3d 66, 68 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding); and when a trial court issues a non-
appealable order that is procedurally void, In re Office of the Attorney Gen., 257 S.W.3d
695, 696 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
45. 280 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
46. Lewis v. Funderburk, 253 S.W.3d 204, 205-06 (Tex. 2008).




51. Id. at 206-07 (citing Lewis v. Funderburk, 191 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. App.-Waco
2006), rev'd, 253 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2008)).
52. Id. at 207-08.
2009]
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expert report is inadequate is a motion pursuant to section 74.351(b) of
the Code, and is accordingly reviewable by interlocutory appeal pursuant
to section 51.014(a)(9). 53
As demonstrated in Lewis, a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss
an allegedly deficient expert report is subject to interlocutory review. 54
However, what if the trial court denies the motion to dismiss but contem-
poraneously grants a thirty-day extension to cure the deficiency in the
report? In Ogletree v. Matthews, the Texas Supreme Court held that a
defendant may not immediately seek interlocutory review when a trial
court both denies a motion to dismiss and grants a thirty-day extension to
cure a deficient report.55 The supreme court rested its decision on the
provision in Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
that expressly prohibits an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's order
granting a thirty-day extension to cure a deficient report. 56 The supreme
court reasoned that the legislative prohibition on such an appeal is "both
logical and practical. '57 "If a defendant could immediately (and prema-
turely) appeal, the court of appeals would address the report's sufficiency
while its deficiencies were presumably being cured at the trial court level,
an illogical and wasteful result."'58 Accordingly, "when a[n expert] report
has been served, the actions denying the motion to dismiss and granting
an extension are inseparable," and permitting appeal from denial of the
motion to dismiss would render meaningless the legislative ban on inter-
locutory appeals from orders granting extensions to cure a deficient
report.59
2. Orders Relating to Arbitration
Under the Texas Arbitration Act, an order denying an application to
compel arbitration is appealable. 60 However, appellate jurisdiction over
interlocutory appeals is generally final in the courts of appeal. 61 As con-
firmed by the supreme court in Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen,62 the only
bases for supreme court jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from
53. Id. For the reasons stated in Lewis, the supreme court also disposed of Bismar v.
Morehead, 262 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); Moore v. Gatica, 253 S.W.3d 219
(Tex. 2008) (per curiam); Diaz-Rohena v. Melton, 253 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam);
Ctr. for Neurological Disorders, P.A. v. George, 253 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam);
Collini v. Pustejovsky, 253 S.W.3d 216 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); Hill Reg'l Hosp. v. Run-
nels, 253 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); Metwest Inc. v. Rodriguez, 253 S.W.3d 212
(Tex. 2008) (per curiam); Graham Oaks Care Ctr., Inc. v. Farabee, 251 S.W.3d 63 (Tex.
2008) (per curiam).
54. Lewis, 253 S.W.3d at 208.
55. 262 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. 2007).




59. Id. at 321.
60. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.098(a)(1) (Vernon 2008).
61. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
62. 268 S.W.3d 51, 55 n.8 (Tex. 2008) (citing Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of
London v. Celebrity, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1998)).
[Vol. 62
Appellate Practice and Procedure
the denial of arbitration include (1) when there is a dissenting opinion in
the court of appeals or (2) when a conflict exists between the decision of
the court of appeals and a prior decision of the supreme court or another
court of appeals. 63
3. Agreed Interlocutory Appeals
The same limitations on the Texas Supreme Court's jurisdiction over an
interlocutory appeal from the denial of arbitration apply to an agreed
interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Fleming, the su-
preme court clarified that "the Legislature allows petitions for review
from interlocutory appeals only when the court of appeals issue[s] a dis-
senting opinion or when the court of appeals' decision conflict[s] with a
prior decision of the supreme court or ... another court of appeals.
64
4. Orders Granting or Denying Transfer of Venue for Convenience of
the Parties
Under section 15.002(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, a court may transfer venue of a case for the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. 65 The court's decision
to grant or deny transfer under section 15.002(b) "is not grounds for ap-
peal or mandamus and is not reversible error."'66 This is so, even if the
motion to transfer venue is based only in part of section 15.002(b) and
there is nothing in the record to support a transfer under that section.
67
If the motion "sufficiently invoke[s section 15.002(b)] in requesting a
transfer, it [is] statutorily beyond review."'68 Accordingly, "it is irrelevant
whether a transfer for convenience is supported by any record
evidence." 69
II. PRESERVATION OF ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT
There are few errors that are "fundamental"-preserved for appeal de-
spite the lack of timely objection at the trial court. One is "incurable"
jury argument, where "the argument by its nature, degree, and extent
constituted such error that an instruction from the court or retraction of
the argument" cannot "eliminate the probability that it resulted in an im-
63. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 22.001(a)(1)-(2), 22.225(c). There are some excep-
tions to this limitation on the supreme court's jurisdiction, which are not relevant in the
arbitration context. See id. § 22.225(d); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 51.014(a)(3), (6), (11) (Vernon 2008).
64. 248 S.W.3d 166, 166 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (failing to find requisite conflict or
dissent and dismissing for want of jurisdiction); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griesing,
251 S.W.3d 471, 472 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (same).
65. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(b) (Vernon 2002).
66. Id. § 15.002(c).
67. Trend Offset Printing Servs., Inc. v. Collin County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 249 S.W.3d





proper verdict."'70 Because such argument harms both the litigants and
the judicial system, it "is not subject to the general harmless error analy-
sis."' 71 The Texas Supreme Court found incurable jury argument in Liv-
ing Centers, a nursing home wrongful death case where liability was
stipulated.72 There was no need to preserve the error made by plaintiff's
counsel in closing argument on damages, where he compared the de-
fense's attempts to minimize damages to a World War II German pro-
gram (the T-4 Project) in which elderly and infirm persons were used for
medical experimentation and killed.73 The supreme court was livid:
"[T]he jury argument was designed to incite passions of the jury and turn
the jurors against defense counsel for doing what lawyers are ethically
bound to do: advocate clients' interests within the bounds of law."'74
Also during the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court endorsed a
variant of "stock objections" in Arkoma Basin Exploration Co. v. FMF
Associates 1990-A, Ltd.75 After an adverse jury verdict, the defendant
filed a post-trial motion asserting that "there is no evidence.., to support
the jury's answers to each part of Question 4," the damages question.76
The plaintiffs claimed the objection was deficient because it did not spec-
ify why the evidence was legally deficient. The supreme court rejected
that argument, holding that "[g]enerally, a no-evidence objection directed
to a single jury issue is sufficient to preserve error without further detail,"
and in fact is "what careful practitioners should do."' 77 However, the su-
preme court cautioned that the same single objection made to a number
of jury answers is too general, and if a single jury question involves many
issues, it is possible that a general objection might not be sufficient. 78 The
supreme court justified the stock post-trial objection "because time is
short . . . and the trial court is already familiar with the case" at this
point.79
III. JUDGMENTS
A. FORMATION OF THE JUDGMENT
House Bills 2415 and 4 lowered the minimum and maximum judgment
interest rates in Texas.80 The new interest rates apply to final judgments
that are "signed or subject to appeal on or after [September 1, 2003]."81
In Columbia Medical Center of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, the trial court
70. Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Penalver, 256 S.W.3d 678, 680-81 (Tex. 2008) (per
curiam).
71. Id. at 681.
72. Id. at 682.
73. Id. at 680-81.
74. Id. at 682.
75. 249 S.W.3d 380, 387-88 (Tex. 2008).
76. Id. at 387.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 388.
79. Id.
80. Tex. H.B. 2415 & 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
81. Id.
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signed its final judgment on December 3, 2002, before the effective date
of the amendments.8 2 The Texas Supreme Court held that, contrary to
the appellant's argument, "subject to appeal" means "capable of being
appealed," not "on appeal."'8 3 Thus, the amended interest rates did not
apply.8 4
"Once a trial court loses plenary power over a judgment, only clerical
errors may be corrected by judgment nunc pro tunc."'s 5 During the Sur-
vey period, a court of appeals confirmed that "[i]f the written judgment
accurately reflects the judgment actually rendered by the trial court, the
written judgment cannot be corrected through judgment nunc pro tunc
signed after the trial court's plenary power expires."'8 6
B. FINALITY OF THE JUDGMENT
Whether a trial court's judgment is final, and thus within the jurisdic-
tion of the court of appeals, has vexed Texas courts for decades. In the
2001 opinion of Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., the supreme court enunci-
ated a rule that sought to simplify the issues.87 However, the appellate
courts continue to grapple with whether a particular order disposes of all
parties and all issues in a cause. This year was no exception. Here are
some of the highlights:
" In 2006, the supreme court held that in probate cases "multiple judg-
ments final ... can be rendered on certain discrete issues."'88 During
the Survey period, the Dallas Court of Appeals extended the rule to
divorce cases, deciding that after a divorce is final, various post-judg-
ment petitions (such as for enforcement of contractual alimony) can
be filed under the same cause number as the underlying divorce. 89
Each petition is a distinctly different action and is prosecuted sepa-
rately, with separate citations served on the respondent. 90 Thus,
when the summary judgment disposes of all claims and all parties in
one of the post-judgment petitions, it is final for purposes of
appeal.9 1
" An order denying a request to take a pre-suit deposition under Rule
202 is final and appealable "only if the deposition sought is against a
third party against whom suit is not contemplated." 92 During the
Survey period, the Houston Court of Appeals, First District, fol-
82. 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 257.
85. In re Dickerson, 259 S.W.3d 299, 301 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2008, orig. proceed-
ing [mand. denied]).
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001).
88. Brittingham-Sada de Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006).
89. Eberstein v. Hunter, 260 S.W.3d 626, 628-29 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
90. Id.
91. Id.




lowed the Dallas and Waco Courts of Appeal, concluding that an
order denying the pre-suit deposition of a deponent who was the tar-
get of a contemplated legal malpractice suit was not final, and there-
fore not appealable. 93
* An order denying a party's motion to vacate an arbitration panel's
determination to certify a class is an interlocutory order not subject
to appeal. 94
IV. EXTENDING THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
In an important decision for appellate practitioners, the Texas Supreme
Court held, in Arkoma Basin Exploration Co. v. FMF Associates 1990-A,
Ltd., that a trial court's order suggesting a remittitur modifies a judgment
and restarts the appellate timetables. 95 Under the rules of procedure,
"[i]f a judgment is modified ... in any respect" the deadlines run from the
date of the modified judgment.9 6 A remittitur order is a rather strange
beast that does not fit within the rule, as it does not actually change the
judgment, but only suggests a change-the court suggests that the plain-
tiff take a lesser amount of damages on the condition that a new trial will
be granted if it is refused. 97 In Arkoma Basin, the supreme court con-
cluded that such an order does change the judgment because it "allows
only two options: a smaller judgment or a new trial." 98 "While it may not
be clear when the order is signed which option a claimant will select, it is
immediately clear that the original judgment will change." 99 The order
thus "modifies" the original judgment and restarts the appellate clock. 10 0
V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
When a party submits a timely request for written findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the trial court has a mandatory duty to prepare such
findings and conclusions. 10 1 "[The] court's failure to respond to a timely
request is presumed to be harmful error, unless the appellate record af-
firmatively shows that the complaining party has suffered no harm. '10 2
In Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance v. Laca, the trial court failed to respond
to Liberty Mutual's timely request for findings and conclusions, even af-
ter Liberty Mutual notified the court that they were past due. 10 3 The
court of appeals held that the trial court's failure to respond was harmful
93. Id.
94. John M. O'Quinn, P.C. v. Wood, 244 S.W.3d 549, 552-53 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2007,
no pet.).
95. 249 S.W.3d 380, 390-91 (Tex. 2008).
96. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(h).
97. Arkoma, 249 S.W.3d at 390.
98. Id. at 391.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 297.
102. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. v. Laca, 243 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007, no
pet.).
103. Id. at 793-94.
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error, since it "forced [Liberty Mutual] to guess at the underlying basis
for the trial court's judgment.' 10 4
During the pendency of the Liberty Mutual appeal, the trial judge was
replaced as a result of an election. Thus, the appellate court reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial, 10 5 even though the preferable remedy
for such a situation is abatement of the appeal and remand to the trial
court for entry of findings and conclusions. 10 6
VI. SUPERSEDING THE JUDGMENT
By statute, supersedeas bonds, which provide security for a money
judgment while on appeal, must not exceed 50% of the judgment debtor's
net worth or $25 million.' 0 7 During the Survey period, the en banc Hous-
ton Court of Appeals, First District, agreed with its sister Houston appel-
late court and the Dallas Court of Appeals that "net worth" means
"current assets minus current liabilities."' 108 Specifically, the judgment
debtor in EnviroPower, L.L.C. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., had, under this
definition, a net worth of minus $12 million. But because there was a
contingent contract to purchase the company for $10 million, its market
value was potentially much higher. The trial court set a $200,000 superse-
deas bond, after concluding that the market value was $8 million and that
a bond for the full amount of the judgment ($1.3 million) would cause
substantial economic harm, but a bond of $200,000 would not. 10 9 The en
banc court held that the trial court used the wrong measure of net worth
and remanded to determine the amount of the bond, if any.'1 0 In its
opinion, the court of appeals focused on the practical realities-the possi-
bility of a future sale does not provide funds for the purchase of a super-
sedeas bond."'
VII. PLENARY POWER OF THE TRIAL COURT
At last, the Texas Supreme Court has changed the rule found "nowhere
but Texas" that previously prevented trial courts from "ungranting" a
motion for new trial more than seventy-five days after it was signed. 112
The problem occurs when a trial judge (1) renders judgment on a verdict,
(2) grants a new trial motion, and (3) then reconsiders and sets aside (or
104. Id. at 795.
105. Id. at 796.
106. Id.; see, e.g., In re Marriage of Palacios, No. 07-08-0006-CV, 2008 WL 4346714, at
*1 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Sept. 23, 2008, no pet.) (per curiam) ("Thus, the appropriate
remedy is to abate the appeal for entry of proper findings and conclusions.").
107. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006(b)(1)-(2) (Vernon 2008); TEX. R.
App. P. 24.2(a)(1).
108. EviroPower, L.L.C. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 265 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
109. Id. at 4-5, 9.
110. Id. at 7.
111. Id. at 5-6.
112. In re Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, 280 S.W.3d 227, 229, 232 (Tex. 2008).
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vacates) the new trial order and reinstates the original judgment. 113 In
Baylor Medical Center, the procedural history was more complicated, due
to there being three different judges holding the office of judge of the
160th District Court over the course of the case. The first judge signed a
take-nothing judgment, then granted a new trial. The second judge va-
cated the new trial order and reinstated judgment on the verdict, then
reconsidered and again reinstated the new trial order. A third judge was
elected to the bench after the mandamus on the merits of the reinstated
new trial order was pending."14
In these circumstances, Rule 7.2 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
would ordinarily compel the court of appeals to abate the mandamus to
allow the new judge to reconsider the order.115 But under the rule of
Porter v. Vick,116 the trial court would have no power to reconsider the
order because more than seventy-five days had passed since the order
was signed.'1 7 The Porter rule is based upon a notion that a trial court's
plenary power over the original judgment ends, thus limiting the trial
court's power to do as it wishes when it grants a motion for new trial.118
Recognizing that this rule simply does not fit with the concepts of trial
court plenary power now articulated in the appellate rules, the supreme
court in Baylor Medical Center overruled Porter.119 Now, when a trial
court grants a new trial, "the case stands on the trial court's docket the
same as though no trial had been had. Accordingly, the trial court should
then have the power to set aside a new trial order any time before a final
judgment is entered. '1 20 Under Baylor Medical Center, "[a] trial court's
plenary jurisdiction gives it not only the authority but the responsibility to
review any pre-trial order upon proper motion."' 121
Rule 306a(4) allows the trial court to restart the appellate and plenary
power clocks when a party receives late notice of judgment. 122 If the
party has not learned of the judgment "within twenty days after the judg-
ment," the date of actual notice of the judgment is treated as the date to
start the clock ticking, so long as it does not begin more than ninety days
after the date original judgment was signed.' 23 In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
v. Erickson, the bank suffered a default judgment due to a lawyer's mis-
take.124 The clerk failed to send notice of the judgment, and the bank
learned of the judgment more than thirty days after the judgment was
signed, when it was already final and the appellate deadlines had run.
113. Id. at 228-29.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 228.
116. 888 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1994).
117. Baylor Med. Ctr., 280 S.W.3d at 228.
118. See id. at 230.
119. Id. at 230-32.
120. Id. at 230-31 (internal quotations omitted).
121. Id. at 231.
122. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).
123. Id.
124. 267 S.W.3d 139, 141-43 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.).
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The bank filed a motion for new trial and asked the trial court to restart
the clock, but the trial court denied the motion due to a failure of proof-
the bank proved that the clerk did not send timely notice, but did not
prove that the bank did not receive actual notice from any other
source. 125 The bank then filed a second motion to extend deadlines and a
supplemental motion for new trial, which the trial court granted. 126
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court's order granting the
new trial was within its plenary jurisdiction.1 27 The plaintiff argued that
once the trial judge denied the motion to extend deadlines, its plenary
power expired, and it could not consider any further motions. The court
of appeals disagreed, correctly, because the fundamental nature of a mo-
tion to extend deadlines is to restart the trial court's plenary power after
it has expired according to the usual deadlines. 128
There is no deadline for filing a rule 306a motion, except that the
motion must be filed and ruled upon while the court retains plenary
power, and the time for the court's plenary power is counted from
the date of notice of the judgment as alleged in the rule 306a
motion. 29
When does a second motion for new trial-made within thirty days of
judgment-not extend the appellate deadlines? The Texas Supreme
Court confronted this issue in In re Brookshire Grocery Co. and con-
cluded that a second motion for new trial filed after a first timely motion
is overruled does not extend plenary power deadlines. 130 In Brookshire,
the first motion for new trial was filed before the judgment was signed
and was overruled by order the day after the judgment was signed. At
that point the trial court's plenary power was set to expire thirty days
after the date the motion for new trial was overruled. But then a second
motion for new trial was filed on the twenty-ninth day after judgment,
within the thirty days that a party has to file a motion for new trial, which
would ordinarily extend the court's plenary power deadlines. The trial
judge granted the motion more than thirty days after the first motion was
overruled, but within its plenary power if the second motion extended
deadlines. 3 1
Relying on the language and long history of Rule 329b of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Texas Supreme Court held that the second
motion was "timely" in that it was filed within the thirty-day deadline, but
it was not "timely" for purposes of extending plenary power because it
was filed after the first motion was overruled. 32 A party is not precluded
from filing a second motion for new trial, but the court must grant it
125. Id. at 143-44.
126. Id. at 145.
127. Id. at 146.
128. Id. at 146, 148.
129. Id. at 148.
130. 250 S.W.3d 66, 69 (Tex. 2008).
131. Id. at 68.
132. Id. at 70-71.
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within thirty days after the first is overruled. 133 The supreme court distin-
guished the situation from one where the party files a different type of
Rule 329b motion ("such as a motion to modify, correct, or reform the
judgment") after the first motion for new trial is overruled.' 34 The mo-
tion to modify would extend the trial court's plenary power, as Rule
329b(e) provides that plenary power expires thirty days after all such mo-
tions are overruled. 13 5
VIII. PERFECTING THE APPEAL
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court confirmed that
"'[i]f the appellant timely files a document in a bona fide attempt to in-
voke the appellate court's jurisdiction, the court of appeals, on appel-
lant's motion, must allow the appellant an opportunity to amend or refile
the instrument."' 13 6 Thus, where an insurer filed a notice of appeal in its
insured's name but clearly listed its subrogation interest on the docketing
statement, the insurer should have been permitted to amend the notice to




Appellate courts are not to give advisory opinions and, in fact, have no
jurisdiction to do so. Nevertheless, because early advice from an appel-
late court can be extremely valuable, litigants and trial judges try to figure
out ways to disguise their requests. In Clark & Co. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co., the Dallas Court of Appeals determined that a
severance order was merely an attempt at an unauthorized interlocutory
appeal of a particular ruling in the trial court, contrary to the limitations
on appellate jurisdiction. 138 The trial court struck the defendant's
amended answer that alleged various affirmative defenses and counter-
claims. After the defendant refused to agree to an interlocutory appeal,
the trial court severed the counterclaims at plaintiff's request, forcing the
defendant to immediately appeal the order striking the counterclaims.
The court also abated the trial on the remaining claims. 139 The court of
appeals held that the severance order "was an improper attempt to obtain
133. Id. at 72.
134. Id.
135. Id. A vigorous dissent decried "tricky procedural rules" that threaten substantive
rights, and argued that a second motion for new trial should have the same result as a
subsequent motion to modify. Id. at 74 (Hecht, J., dissenting, joined by Wainwright, J.,
Brister, J., and Green, J.).
136. Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners v. Park Warwick, L.P., 244 S.W.3d 838,
839 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Grand Prairie Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. S. Parts Imp. Inc., 813 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam)).
137. Id. at 839-40.
138. No. 05-07-01097-CV, 2008 WL 4635852, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
139. Id. at *2.
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an advisory opinion" and reversed the severance order and ordered the
trial court to proceed on the whole case. 140 Noting that the plaintiff con-
ceded that the claims were so interwoven that they could not proceed
separately when it requested abatement of the remaining claims pending
determination of the appeal, the court concluded that "the severance was
illusory [and] done solely to effectuate an interlocutory appeal . . .not
authorized by statute.' 1 41
B. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AFTER NONSUIT
In Villafani v. Trejo, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether a
defendant's motion for sanctions under the Medical Liability Insurance
Improvement Act (MLIIA) survives a motion for nonsuit.142 In that
case, the plaintiff took a nonsuit for its claims against a defendant medical
provider after the trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss
and for sanctions due to plaintiff's failure to serve an expert report. The
medical provider appealed the denial of the motion for sanctions. The
court of appeals held that the nonsuit mooted the order denying the mo-
tion for sanctions, thus depriving the court of appeals of jurisdiction.143
The supreme court reversed, reminding that while a plaintiff has an abso-
lute right to a nonsuit, the decision to nonsuit does not control the fate of
another party's independent claims for affirmative relief.' 44 Whether a
particular claim for sanctions is "a claim for affirmative relief that sur-
vives a nonsuit" depends upon the sanction's purpose, and the motion for
sanctions under the MLIIA survives a nonsuit because the purpose of the
statute is to deter meritless claims.1 45 Moreover, the fact that the motion
was ruled upon and was no longer a "pending" claim for relief at the time
of nonsuit does not prevent appeal of the order denying the relief.1 4 6
X. WAIVER ON APPEAL
An appellant may not "assert new grounds for reversal in a reply brief
after the omitted grounds have been pointed out in a response. '147 Any
new grounds asserted in this manner are waived.' 48 During the Survey
period, the Houston Court of Appeals, Fourteenth District, made it clear
that this rule applies equally to traditional appeals and original
140. Id. at *3.
141. Id.
142. 251 S.W.3d 466, 467 (Tex. 2008).
143. Id. at 467-68.
144. Id. at 469.
145. Id. at 470.
146. Id. at 469; see Regent Care Ctr. of San Antonio II v. Hargrave, 251 S.W.3d 517, 518
(Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (holding court of appeals has jurisdiction over sanctions order
regardless of whether nonsuit was with or without prejudice); Barrera v. Rico, 251 S.W.3d
519, 520 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (remanding to court of appeals to consider the merits in
light of Villafani).
147. In re TCW Global Project Fund II, Ltd., 274 S.W.3d 166, 171 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); see TEX. R. App. P. 38.3.




"[A] litigant who has obtained a favorable judgment and has no reason
to complain in the trial court is not required to raise an issue regarding an
alternative ground of recovery until an appellate court reverses the judg-
ment.' 150 Thus, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
buyer had waived his alternative theory of recovery, refund of earnest
money, by failing to file a notice of appeal. 151 Because the buyer had
obtained a favorable judgment for specific performance, he was not re-
quired to raise the earnest money issue until the judgment about which
he had no complaint was reversed. 152
XI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court expounded on the
harmless error analysis in cases involving the improper admission of evi-
dence of the defendant's wealth. In Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. v.
Sevcik, a car crash lawsuit, the trial judge allowed the plaintiffs' lawyer to
ask questions about the defendant's size and wealth-it was a large Cali-
fornia company with almost $2 billion in revenues and 3,000 employ-
ees. 153 The suit did not involve punitive damages, so the supreme court
easily concluded that the evidence was inadmissible. 54 In evaluating
whether the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless, the supreme
court cautioned that "[a] reviewing court must evaluate the whole case
from voir dire to closing argument, considering the 'state of the evidence,
the strength and weakness of the case, and the verdict." 155 The supreme
court focused on four criteria: (1) the effect of the evidence on the ver-
dict, (2) the evidence's role in the context of the trial, (3) counsel's em-
phasis upon the evidence, and (4) the party's effort to get the evidence
admitted.' 5 6 The supreme court concluded the wealth evidence played a
crucial role on a key issue at trial because parts of the damage findings
were not supported by the evidence and the only real issue in the case
was damages. 157
The Survey period also found the Texas Supreme Court deeply divided
on the application of the principles of statutory construction. In City of
Rockwall v. Hughes, the supreme court struggled over how to interpret
the arbitration provision of a Texas annexation statute. 158 Both the ma-
jority and the dissent purported to "ascertain and give effect to the Legis-
lature's intent as expressed by the language of the statute," and to accord
149. Id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 52.5.
150. DiGiuseppe v. Lawler, 269 S.W.3d 588, 603 (Tex. 2008).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. v. Sevcik, 267 S.W.3d 867, 869 (Tex. 2008).
154. Id. at 873.
155. Id. at 871 (quoting Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tex.
1979).
156. Id. at 871-74.
157. Id. at 871-75.
158. 246 S.W.3d 621, 621-31 (Tex. 2008).
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the statute's words "their plain and common meaning." 159 The majority
admitted that its interpretation was not especially logical, but "our stan-
dard for construing statutes is not to measure them for logic.' 160 The
dissent found the majority's interpretation to cross the line from illogical
to absurd and urged that the statute be interpreted "in context."'16 1
XII. DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
During the Survey period, the Amarillo Court of Appeals confirmed
that only appellate courts have the authority to dismiss an appeal.' 62
Thus, when parties asked that their appeal be abated and remanded so
that the trial court could order dismissal, the court of appeals dismissed
the appeal itself.163
In a health care liability case, the plaintiff must serve its expert reports
"not later than the 120th day after the date the original petition was
filed. '164 If "the report[s] are found deficient, the court may grant one
30-day extension to the [plaintiff] in order to cure the deficiency."' 165 In
Leland v. Brandal, the Texas Supreme Court held that when the court of
appeals (as opposed to the trial court) finds that an expert report is defi-
cient, it is statutorily authorized to remand the case for consideration of
whether a thirty-day extension should be granted to the plaintiff. 166
In another health care liability case, the supreme court followed its
holding in Leland and held that the plaintiff was entitled to a remand for
consideration of the extension issue. It also held that the court of ap-
peals' decision to reverse and render judgment in favor of the defendant
due to deficiencies in the plaintiff's expert reports was error. 16 7
The Texas Supreme Court confirmed that under certain circumstances,
a party is entitled to have his case remanded for a new trial on attorney's
fees when compensatory damages are reduced on appeal. 168 In Bossier
Chrysler-Dodge II, Inc. v. Rauschenberg, a divided court of appeals "re-
duced the trial court's damage award by eighty-seven percent" but af-
firmed the trial court's attorney's fees award. 169 The Texas Supreme
Court reversed the appellate court's decision regarding attorney's fees,
159. Id. at 625; see id. at 633-34.
160. Id. at 629.
161. Id. at 631-34 (Willet, J., dissenting, joined by Hecht, J., O'Neill, J., and Brister, J.).
162. See Golovko v. Woodard, No. 07-06-0442-CV, 2007 WL 3254429, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo Nov. 5, 2007, no pet.) (per curiam).
163. Id.
164. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008).
165. Id. § 74.351(c).
166. 257 S.W.3d 204, 207-08 (Tex. 2008).
167. Martinez-Partido v. Methodist Specialty & Transplant Hosp., 267 S.W.3d 881, 882
(Tex. 2008) (per curiam). Health care liability cases decided under the prior statute will
not necessarily command the same result, as the prior statute allowed a thirty-day exten-
sion to correct deficient expert reports only if the deficiency was the result of an accident
or mistake. See In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 469 (Tex. 2008).





holding that "the issue of attorney's fees should ordinarily be retried
under these circumstances unless the appellate court is reasonably certain
that the jury was not significantly influenced by the erroneous [damage
award]. "170
In Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, the Texas Supreme Court held that the
Pattern Jury Charge's definition of "manufacturing defect," which had
been submitted to the jury by the trial court, was incorrect. 171 Noting
that "trial courts routinely rely on the Pattern Jury Charges in submitting
cases to juries," and that "the interests of justice would not be served by
reversing and rendering judgment in favor of [the defendant]," the su-
preme court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. a72
170. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
171. 242 S.W.3d. 32, 41 (Tex. 2007).
172. Id. at 45.
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